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Abstract: The bulk of acid depositions, which have harmful effects on the environment,
are caused by foreign emissions in many European countries. Therefore, if some countries
emit more acids, one cannot be sure that countries that emit less will benefit from reduced
acid depositions. However, numerical simulations with the RAINS model indicate that
differences in costs and acid depositions are negatively correlated when equally expensive
cost-effective scenarios for Europe are compared, and scenarios only differ with respect to
the constraints on depositions at various locations. The negative correlation is twofold:
both the signs of changes for individual countries and the magnitude of changes between
countries are negatively correlated. The novelty of this paper is to explain these findings. It
is shown how the structure of atmospheric transport coefficients must be accounted for in
order to understand the numerical findings. Since the atmospheric transport coefficients
are constant, the hypothesis is that the two types of correlation will exist for all targets on
acidification in Europe. This insight can help policymakers to agree upon a methodology
for calculating targets for acidification, and maybe it also can help them to find a
consensus upon more ambitious policies towards acidification.
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21. Introduction: Theories and Policies for Reduced Acidification in
Europe and USA
For many European countries, the bulk of acid depositions, which have harmful
effects on the environment, are caused by foreign emissions (SO2, NOx and NH3).
Therefore, if some countries emit more acids, one cannot be sure that countries
that emit less will benefit from reduced acid depositions. However, some numerical
optimisations indicate that differences in costs and acid depositions are negatively
correlated when equally expensive cost-effective scenarios for Europe are
compared, and scenarios only differ with respect to the constraints on depositions
at various locations. The negative correlation is twofold: both the signs of changes
for individual countries and the magnitude of changes between countries are
negatively correlated.
The novelty of this paper is to provide explanations for these results. In
particular it is shown how they can be explained by the structure of atmospheric
transport coefficients. The hypothesis is therefore that the two types of correlation
will exist no matter how the targets on European acidification are calculated. This
insight can help policymakers to agree upon a methodology for calculating targets
for acidification, and maybe it also can help them to find a consensus upon more
ambitious policies. Additional evidence for the existence of the two types of
negative correlation are also offered.
A basic lesson from environmental economics is that, in absence of
regulations, emission levels will typically be too large from a social point of view
since emitters impose a negative externality upon society. The simplest textbook
answer to such problems is to internalise the externality either by an appropriate
Pigovian tax or by a system of tradable emission permits. If it is assumed that the
emitters’ location are unimportant, which is the case for instance for greenhouse
gases’ impact on the climate, both these policy instruments will typically generate
3optimal decentralised solutions where marginal abatement costs are the same for
all emitters. However, this solution does not work for acidification since the
damage caused by an emitted amount of acids depends on the emitter’s location.
Many contributions in the economic literature concerned with acidification
deals with modified emission-trading systems. The discussion of emission trading
versus pollution trading in Montgomery (1972) is a classical reference point in this
literature. In the emission trading system the holder of a permit has an allowance
to emit a certain amount of the substance under consideration, for instance SO2. In
the pollution trading system, however, the holder of a permit has an allowance to
pollute a certain amount at the location that the permit is valid for. For
acidification, a pollution permit could be an allowance to deposit a certain amount
of acids at a particular location.1 Montgomery (1972) showed that emission permit
trading typically fails to be cost-effective when the location of emitting sources are
important, while trading in pollution permits generate cost-effectiveness. So,
according to the analysis of Montgomery, a decentralised social optimum may be
reached for acidification too.
Both Krupnick et al. (1983) and Tietenberg (1985) argue that Montgomery’s
analysis is based on too simple assumptions. In particular, they argue that
transaction costs, which are neglected in Montgomery (1972), would be substantial
in the pollution permit market since all emitters must buy pollution permits for all
locations where their emissions cause any depositions. If one believe that these
transaction costs are sufficiently large, it can be argued that the emission trading
system is a better system than pollution trading even though the former system
ignores the differences in damage caused by emissions at different locations.
In USA, sulphur emission permits are traded in a nation-wide permit market
for electricity producers, which accounts for nearly 70% of the sulphur dioxide
(SO2) emissions. There are no restrictions on trade apart the local ambient air
quality standards. However, it is uncertain whether the expected reduction in acid
4deposition will be met in the sensitive areas (Klaassen and Nentjes 1997). The
disadvantages with emission trading compared to pollution trading are therefore
illustrated, and, according to Rodríguez (1999), these disadvantages exclude the
possibility of using an emission permit system in Europe. The differences between
ecosystems’ sensitivity to acid depositions are also larger in Europe (Klaassen and
Nentjes 1997). Consequently, an emission permit market is probably better for USA
than for Europe.
Several other trading systems are also studied in the literature. See for
instance Burtraw et al. (1998), Krupnick et al. (1983), Klaassen et al. (1994), Førsund
and Nævdal (1998) and Rodríguez (1999). Taken together, these contributions
search for a trading system where the potential cost-savings in an emission permit
trading system can be combined with the more secure environmental benefits in
the pollution permit trading system. However, even though joint implementation
was an intention in the Second Sulphur Protocol (UN/ECE 1996), parties have to this
date not agreed on how this should be done in practice. Instead, the European
policy has followed a dual track of (a) national emission ceilings, without any trade
between countries, and (b) legislation on standards, for instance on the maximum
sulphur content in fuels. The obligations are signed upon in protocols within the
UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). For
individual European, Klaassen and Nentjes (1997) did not find any evidence for
trades where permissions to emit were transferred from one party to another in
exchange for money.
The RAINS2 model has been used extensively within LRTAP both during the
negotiations on the Second Sulphur Protocol (Amann et al. 1996; Heyes et al.
1997) and during the negotiations on the new multi-effect, multi-pollutant
protocol.3 The model can be used to calculate cost-minimising emission
reductions, subject to environmental constraints on acidification, eutrophication
and ground level ozone in 150x150 km grids covering all Europe (Alcamo and
5Hordijk 1990; Amann et al. 1998c). According to UN/ECE (1996), obligations in the
Second Sulphur Protocol are in fact calculated by optimisation. If one believes that
the RAINS model
- is able to calculate the cost-effective allocation of acid emissions
between countries, and
- differences in damage caused by emissions from various locations within
countries are neglected,
the outcome of RAINS simulations mimics the allocation of emissions between
countries that would occur in a pollution permit trading system. Now, if countries
- agree to abate the amount specified by a RAINS optimisation and
-  they implement national obligations by a domestic emission trading
 systems or a country-specific Pigouvian tax,
 then each country can obtain the secure environmental benefit of the pollution
trading system without the excessive transaction costs that Krupnick et al. (1983)
and Tietenberg (1985) associates with this system. A similar argument is offered in
Krupnick et al. (1983). They discuss a system where some administrators first
distribute emission permits according to the cost-effective solution, and then
permits are traded in zones on one-to-one basis. However, they disregard this
system since it is a potential nightmare for the administrators who face the
enormous task of calculating, and continuing readjusting, the cost-effective
solution. However, thanks to the RAINS model, the task is manageable for Europe
now.
Even though parties within the convention are conscious of the need for a
cost-effective approach to combating air pollution, there have been some
discussions about alternative rules for calculating environmental targets at various
locations, called targeting principles (Amann et al. 1998a, 1998b, 1998d). For
instance, one can require a certain reduction in acidification compared to an initial
6situation (gap closure) or, alternatively, the acidification can be constrained by the
same amount everywhere (ceiling). In addition, acidification can be measured in
several ways. For instance one can measure how much the acid deposition on
average exceeds the tolerance of ecosystems at a particular location (mean
accumulated excess), or, alternatively, one can measure the share of ecosystems
that have a tolerance less than the deposition level (share unprotected area). The
constraints on acid depositions can therefore be calculated in many ways. Also,
since the environmental constraints have a decisive influence on the distribution
of abatement costs and environmental benefits in the optimal solution, it is not
surprising that there is a controversy about the targeting principles within LRTAP.
Fortunately, when two equally expensive cost-effective solutions, which
differs only with respect to the selected targeting principles, are compared, a
given country typically have to carry largest abatement costs in the scenario
where they obtain the largest reduction in acidification. In addition, if the net
increase in abatement costs from one optimisation to another optimisation is
larger for a particular country than for another country, the former country
typically also obtains a larger net reduction in mean acidification. At least this is
the case in Wolfgang (forthcoming) where three different targeting principles and
the resulting distribution of costs and acidification are analysed (figure 1 illustrates
some of the results). However, no explanations have been offered for these
findings yet.
(Figure 1 about here).
The combination of the two types of negative correlation is called the Eco-
Correlation hereafter, where the word Eco refers to Economy and Ecology. The
finding that Eco-Correlation exists in acidification scenarios is of course
7encouraging since it could be hard for negotiating parties within LRTAP to agree
on any targeting principle in the opposite situation.
For the purpose of this paper, additional evidence of the Eco-Correlation in
acidification scenarios is offered here. Figure 2 illustrates the differences between
the Central and High ambition level scenarios in Amann et al. (1998d).
(Figure 2 about here).
The negative correlation appears also for all other comparisons of acidification
scenarios in Wolfgang (forthcoming) and Amann et al. (1998d).
The main purpose of this paper is, however, to provide an explanation for
the Eco-Correlation. This insight can help policymakers to agree upon a
methodology for calculating targets for acidification, and maybe it also can help
them to find a consensus upon more ambitious policies towards acidification. If
Finus and Tjøtta  (1998) are correct, there is certainly a need for more ambitious
policies. In a game-theoretic framework they show that, for most countries,
emission ceilings specified in the Second Sulphur Protocol are larger than the
emitted amounts in the estimated Nash-equilibrium, given by the emission levels
countries would emit in absence of any international agreements. Their approach
is similar to the approach of Mäler (1989). Mäler concludes that there is a need for
international transfers in order to motivate all countries to participate in the
optimal co-operative solution for reduced acidification. Such transfers are not a
part of the protocols within LRTAP at present. On the other hand, Tjøtta (1999)
uses statistical methods to show that the signing of the First Sulphur Protocol
(UN/ECE 1996) had considerable positive effects on countries’ emission
reductions. This result undermines a central assumption made in Finus and Tjøtta
(1998), namely that emissions were at Nash-equilibrium levels before the Second
Sulphur Protocol was signed. Consequently, one cannot interpret the findings in
8the literature such that the obligations within the LRTAP convention have no
effects on acidification.
It can be argued that one should try to find and understand features of
cost-effective solutions rather than the features of results from RAINS
optimisations like those shown in figures 1 and 2. However, it is not possible to
observe cost-effective abatement policies. Empirical data must therefore be based
on numerical models, and the RAINS model is probably the most reliable tool to
analyse these kinds of problems at present. A proper understanding of this model
has large own value too since it has a central position within the UN/LRTAP
convention. However, it is hard to identify reasons for particular results in RAINS
simulations since the model is large and complex. First, the model uses a lot of
information about abatement costs, atmospheric transport of substances and the
sensitivity towards depositions in various ecosystems. Secondly, there are a lot of
variables and simultaneous equations in the model. Therefore, some delegates
within UN/LRTAP have felt a need for simpler explanations for results than the
documentation of RAINS model.
The formal model that is offered in this paper captures some of the basic
properties of the RAINS model, even though it has a simpler structure. The
simplified model is also analytically manageable, and the mechanisms that lead to
the Eco-Correlation will be identified.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a
formal model for cost-effective reductions of acidification in Europe. The
observation that the atmospheric transport coefficients on average are larger to
domestic grids than to foreign grids is emphasised by the simplified model. Some
characteristics of optimal solutions are also derived in this section, while the
effects of changed targets for acidification are evaluated in section 3. In general,
the model shows how the structure of atmospheric transport coefficients can
9explain the Eco-Correlation shown in figures 1 and 2. Section 4 offers a numerical
example, while section 5 concludes the analysis.
2. The Model
In this section a model for cost-effective reductions of European acidification is
developed. Each country is assumed to emit an acid substance and atmospheric
transport coefficients show how emissions are dispersed and deposited at various
locations. However, countries can abate their emissions at certain costs. A cost-
effective solution is an emission vector that minimises the sum of abatement costs,
subject to constraints on acidification in all regions. The properties of first-order
conditions for this particular problem is well known from the literature. However,
the Eco-Correlation has not been explained yet.
We consider a group of n countries. Let i be the index for countries and I be
the set of countries such that { }1,...,i I n∈ = . Only one emission type, for instance
sulphur dioxide, is taken into account, and the abated amount for a country (ri) is
defined to be the difference between an exogenous no-control level of emissions
(ei
nc) and any other emission level (ei).
r e ei i
nc
i≡ −                 (1)
The abatement cost functions (ci) are assumed to be convex power functions in the
abated amount, and the power (b>1) is the same for all countries. However, it is
reasonable to assume that a given emission reduction is cheapest to obtain in
countries where no-control emissions are relatively large. A country specific
technology parameter (Ai) accounts for this.
( )  for 0bi i i i ic r A r r= ≥                              (2)
A large technology parameter (Ai) implies large abatement costs for a given abated
amount. It is therefore reasonable to assume large technology parameters for
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those countries that have small no-control emissions. In a special case where
A A ei i
nc b
=
−
/
1
, marginal abatement costs are the same for all countries that abate
the same share of their no-control emissions. The cost functions in (2) are
generalised versions of cost functions used in Mäler and de Zeeuw (1998).
The emissions give acid depositions at m different locations under
consideration. Let j be the index of locations (grids) and J be the set of locations
such that { }1,...,j J m∈ = . Constant atmospheric transport coefficients (aij) show
how much the acid depositions increase at location j if emissions are increased by
one unit in country i, while a grid specific constant (dj) accounts for depositions
caused by other sources, like emissions at sea, transatlantic emissions and natural
sources. Total deposition levels at a location (Dj) is given by
4
( )ncj ij i j ij i i ji iD a e d a e r d= + = − +  ,                                 (3)
while reduced depositions are caused by abatement and given by
( ) ( )ncj j ij iiR D e D e a r≡ − = .   (4)
In optimisation, all environmental targets on acidification must be translated into
constraints on acid depositions. The cost-effective solution is therefore given by
the abatement vector (which is equivalent to an emission vector) that minimises
the sum of abatement costs, subject to the constraints on acid deposition
( )jjD D≤ .
Commonly, a non-negative constraint on abatement ( )0nci i ir e e≡ − ≥  is
added too. However, Wolfgang (1999) has shown that this is unsatisfactory on
theoretical grounds since emission levels in principle can be larger than no-control.
It is therefore assumed that marginal abatement costs take the same sign as the
abated amount. It is also common to restrict emissions downward by zero.
However, the cost of removing all acid emissions in a country will be so large in real
11
life examples that this is an irrelevant restriction. The optimisation problem is
therefore given by
1
  .
i
b
r i ii
n
j ij i j
i
min A r
subject to D a e d    j =1, ...,m
=
≥ +


   (5)
In general, this formulation illustrates the type of optimisation done by the RAINS
model. Still, there are several differences between RAINS optimisations and (5).
Firstly, emissions are usually restricted upwards in RAINS by (a) what is agreed on in
existing protocols, and (b) calculated emissions using current legislation on
standards and energy consumption projections (Amann et al. 1997). Secondly, not
all types of abatement possibilities are accounted for in RAINS. For instance, the
model doesn’t consider the possibility of reducing emissions (a) by switching
between main types of fossil fuels like coal and gas or (b) by cutting the overall
consumption of fossil fuels (Cofala and Syri 1998a and 1998b), even though
reduced production typically reduces emissions at zero marginal costs in no-
control (see for instance McKitrick 1999 or Wolfgang 1999). Consequently, there is
an upper bound on abatement called maximum feasible reductions. Thirdly, RAINS
cost-curves are step-wise linear and based on the assumption that abatement
efforts already taken are continued into the future. Finally, several types of
emissions are accounted for and several environmental problems can be
considered simultaneously in RAINS optimisations. For simplicity, these
complicating elements are not accounted for here. The Lagrangian function for (5)
is
( )b ji i j ij i ji j iL A r D a e dλ= − + − −   ,   (6)
 and the first order conditions are
b 1
i i j ijj
A br aλ− = i               (7a)
,  0j ij i j jiD a e d λ≥ + ≥ j                    (7b)
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( )( ) 0jj ij i jiD a e dλ − + = j, (7c)
where j is the shadow price on the constraint on acidification at location j. The
value of j  shows the increase in minimal abatement costs that occurs if the
maximum amount of acid depositions at location j is reduced by one unit. Typically
there are only a few binding constraints in RAINS optimisations when grid-based
acidification targets are used (see for instance Amann et al. 1998b or Wolfgang
forthcoming). Consequently, there are typically only a few strictly positive j.
However, at least one shadow price is strictly positive in the only interesting case
where no-control emissions violate at least one constraint on acid depositions.
From (7a) we can see that marginal abatement costs for a country in the
optimal solution is equal to the sum of shadow prices multiplied with the
respective atmospheric transport coefficients. Consequently, marginal abatement
costs are largest for those countries that have large atmospheric transport
coefficients to locations where the shadow prices on acidification are large. This is
different from the CO2 abatement case where countries typically have equal
marginal abatement costs in a cost-effective solution (see Tietenberg 1985 for
further comparisons). Solving (7a) with respect on abatement yields
1
1b
j ijj
i
i
a
r
A b
λ − 
 =
 
 

,                  (8)
and substituting (8) into (2) gives
1
1
b
b
j ijj
i
b
i
a
c
A b
λ − 
 =
 
 

.                 (9)
This is the abatement costs for a country i in the optimal solution. Both the abated
amount and abatement costs are increasing functions of the sum of shadow prices
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times the atmospheric transport-coefficients. Also, ceteris paribus, a small
technology parameter ( )iA , which implies good abatement technology, gives
relatively large abatement costs compared to other countries. Using (7a) and
ci=Airi
b-1ri, the abatement costs can also be written as
( ) j ijji i i
a
c r r
b
λ
=

.               (10)
If the sum of shadow prices multiplied with the respective atmospheric transport
coefficient is large, then the average abatement costs is large too. Divide by ri on
both sides in (10) to see this.
The relationship between abatement costs and deposition reductions is
found by solving (10) with respect on ri and substituting this into (4). However,
since we mainly are interested in the relationship between abatement costs and
deposition reductions at domestic locations, a subset of locations for each country
is defined. Let iJ be a subset of locations ( )iJ J⊂  such that a location is a member
of the subset if and only if the location belongs to country i.5 The index ji is an index
for the members of the subset Ji such that jiJi. Substituting (10) into (4) for country
k I∈ and location k kj J∈  gives
( )
k k k k
k k
j ij i kj ij ii i k
j kjj
bc r
R a r a a r
aλ ≠
 
 = = +
 
 
 

. (11)
This equation shows deposition reduction in a domestic grid for country k as a
function of country k’s abatement costs in an optimal solution. However, both the
coefficient in front of the parenthesis and the last sum can in general be different
for all locations, and the denominator can be different for all countries.
Consequently, it is not possible to establish any interesting relationship between
abatement costs and deposition reduction in domestic grids unless we account for
some of the structure of atmospheric transport coefficients.
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Figures 3-5 shows the RAINS simulated acid depositions caused by German
SO2 emissions, Dutch NH3 emissions and UK NOx emissions respectively.
(Figures 3-5 about here).
Clearly, the average of atmospheric transport coefficients to domestic grids is
much larger than the average of coefficients to foreign grids. This feature is
emphasised by the following assumption: all atmospheric transport coefficients to
domestic grids are ain and all coefficients to foreign grids are aout, where ain> aout.
Formally:
|
|
in
i
ij out
i
j Ja
a
j Ja
∈ 
=  ∉ 
    and a ain out> > 0 .                               (12)
Now deposition reductions can be written as
( )
k k
in out in out out
j ij i k i k ii i k i
R a r a r a r a a r a r
≠
= = + = − +   , (13)
where the right hand side is the same for all locations within a given country, and
the last term is equal for all countries. This implies that deposition reductions are
equally large for all grids within a country and, more importantly, if a country
abates more than another country then it also obtains larger reductions in acid
depositions in domestic grids. This finding is a consequence of the simplifying
assumption in (12). Still, it strongly suggests that the structure of atmospheric
transport coefficients must be an important element when the Eco-Correlation is
explained. This finding also have clear implications for countries willingness to
trade emission permits in a hypothetical emission trading system, but this is
typically neglected in contributions that discuss such trading systems. 6
However, since countries have different abatement cost functions one can
not a priori be sure that those countries that abate the largest amounts also have to
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carry the largest abatement costs. The cost functions and the features of optimal
solutions must therefore be taken into account too.
Equation (13) implies that the reduced amounts of depositions are the same
for all grids within a country. We can therefore simplify the notation and write Rk
instead of 
kj
R , where Rk is the deposition reduction in all domestic grids for country
k. Solving (10) with respect on ri for country kI and substituting this into (13) gives
( ) ( )k kin out outk ii
j kjj
bc r
R a a a r
aλ
 
 = − +
 
 


, (14)
and this can be written as
( ) ( ) ( )
out out
k i k ii i
k k j kj k jin out in outj j
R a r R a r
c r a a
b a a b a a
λ λ− −= =
− −
 
  (15)
where
( )     ,
k k
k
in out
j jkj j j J j Jj
k
j jj j
jj Jin out out out in
jj
a aa
a
a a a a a
λ λλ
λ λ
λ
λ
∈ ∉
∈
+
≡ =
 = − + ∈  
 
 


(16)
is the weighted average of country k’s atmospheric transport coefficients to all
grids and also to the binding grids. Equation (15) can also be written as
( )k k kc a Rα β= − (17)
where
( ) 0
jj
in outb a a
λ
α = >
−

  and  0outk iiR a rβ> = > . (18)
Now we can easily compare costs and acid depositions for different types of
countries. Hereafter a country is called non-binding if none of the binding
constraints are associated with locations within the country, while the other
countries are called binding countries. First we consider costs and acid depositions
16
for the non-binding countries, and this will typically we the overwhelming majority
of countries. From (16) we can see that outka a=  for such countries, and from (17)
the abatement costs are given by
( )outk kc a Rα β= − . (19)
Clearly, deposition reductions and abatement costs for these countries can be
plotted on the same increasing line. The relative positions on this line can therefore
be found from the relative abatement costs. Since all binding grids are located
outside the non-binding countries we know that outija a= in all cases where i is a
non-binding country and 0jλ > . Consequently, from (9), the abatement costs for a
non-binding country is
1
1
b
out b
jj
i
b
i
a
c
A b
λ − 
 =
 
 

(20)
while the relative abatement costs for two non-binding countries i and j is
1
1b
ji
j i
Ac
c A
− 
=  
 
. (21)
The relative abatement costs is a decreasing function of the relative technology
parameters. This implies that countries that have a large technology parameter
( )iA , have relatively small abatement costs in the optimal solution. Consequently,
non-binding countries’ relative position on the line that relates abatement costs
and deposition reductions for such countries are determined entirely by their
technology parameter.
Now consider abatement cost and deposition reductions for binding
countries ( )outka a> .7 The abatement costs for a binding country k is given by (17),
so the cost for this country would be plotted ( )( ) 0outk ka a Rα β− − > above the
line connecting deposition reductions and costs for all the non-binding countries.
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Consequently, the binding countries have to pay more than the non-binding
countries for a given deposition reduction in domestic grids. The binding countries
also obtain additional deposition reductions for a given technology-parameter Ai.
To see this substitute (8) into (13) for country kI :
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
1     .
b
j kjjin out out
k ii
k
b
jjin out out
b
k ii
k
a
R a a a r
A b
a a a a r
A b
λ
λ
−
−
−
 
 = − +
 
 
 
 = − +
 
 




(22)
From (22) we can see that deposition reductions in the optimal solution is given by
a function that is increasing in the weighted average of atmospheric transport
coefficients to binding grids ( )ka and decreasing in the technology parameter
( )kA . Consequently, the binding countries obtain extra reductions in depositions
for a given abatement technology, but at relatively large costs.
So far the analysis has shown how the model implies a close correlation
between deposition reductions and abatement costs for countries in an optimal
solution. However, the more ambitious purpose of the analysis in this paper is to
provide an explanation for the Eco-Correlation, that is, for the pattern in figures 1
and 2 where two optimisation scenarios are compared. A second optimisation will
therefore be considered in the next section.
3. Modified Targets
This section shows how countries’ abatement costs and deposition reductions are
changed if a new set of targets for acidification is used in the optimisation. The
change in targets can for instance be caused by a general increase in the
ambitious-level so that all constraints on depositions ( )jD  are reduced. This is the
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case for the two RAINS optimisations that is compared in figure 2. Alternatively, a
different targeting principle can be used. In that case, some of the upper
constraints on acid depositions can be increased while others are decreased. This is
the case in figure 1. However, in both cases all changes in the cost-effective
solution are caused by the modification of targets for acid depositions.
Suppose that a new set of targets is used in (5). This will typically lead to
changed values for all endogenous variables. Let the numbers 1 and 2 on top of
variables indicate their values in the first and second optimisation respectively.
First the relative size of change in countries’ abatement costs and deposition
reductions will be evaluated. Afterwards, the signs of change for individual
countries will be considered.
First we consider we a case where the abatement costs is increased for
country i while it is decreased for country k. Then, by assumption, country i have to
carry a larger net increase abatement costs than country k (the net increase in costs
is negative for country k).
2 1 2 1
i i k kc c c c− > − (23)
Deposition reductions for a given country is given by (13), while the difference in
deposition reductions for two countries i and k is given by
( )( )in outi k i kR R a a r r− = − − . (24)
Since the abatement costs is increased for country i and decreased for country k,
and the parameters of the cost functions are assumed to be constant, we know
that the abated amount is increased for country i and decreased for country k.
Consequently, the net difference in (24) is larger in the second optimisation than in
the first, and
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1      i k i k i i k kR R R R R R R R− > −  − > − . (25)
Proposition One. If the cost-effective solution for reduced acidification is
changed as a result of modified targets, then the net increase in both abatement
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costs and deposition reductions are larger for all countries that have to carry larger
abatement costs than for any of the other countries. (Proved by (23) and (25)).
In a graphical plot like those in figures 1 and 2 this means that all countries
above the x-axis are further to the left than all countries below the x-axis.8 That is
also the case in figure 1, but there are some exceptions in figure 2. This is one of the
most important findings in this paper, and it can be established for any set of
monotone-convex cost functions, it does not depend on the specific formulation in
(2). However, the most important findings in the rest of this paper cannot be
established for all monotone-convex cost functions.
Proposition one does not give any information about the relative changes
in costs and deposition reductions within the two groups of countries. For such
comparisons, it is convenient to use the change-rates for existing differences in
abatement costs and deposition reductions from the first to the second
optimisation. The existing differences in abatement costs and deposition
reductions for two countries i and k in the first optimisation are given by
1 1
1 1 1 11 1
1 1
b
b bb b b
jj i k
i k
i k
a a
c c
b A A
λ − − −       
 − = −        
     
 

(26)
and
( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1
1 1
b b bjj in out i k
i k
i k
a a
R R a a
b A A
λ − − −        − = − −             

(27)
while the change-rates are defined by
 ( ) ( )
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2 2 1 1
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i k i k
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i k
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i k
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R R
R R
∧
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
(28)
and given by
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. (30)
Proposition Two. Independent of relative abatement costs and relative
deposition reductions in the first optimisation, existing differences in abatement
costs and deposition reductions (in the first optimisation) are increased if the
change-rates rates for these differences, from the first to the second optimisation,
are positive and vice versa. (Proof is offered in appendix A.)
However, even though the change-rates take the same sign, one cannot
conclude that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country that
obtains the largest net increase in deposition reductions. Suppose, for instance,
that a binding country i have to carry larger abatement costs than another country
k initially, even though country i obtain less deposition reductions in domestic
grids than country k.  Suppose also that the sum of shadow prices is increased from
the first to the second optimisation and that the weighted averages of atmospheric
transport coefficients are constant for these countries. In this case, proposition two
implies that the net increase in costs will be largest for country i while the net
increase in deposition reductions will be largest for country k.  However, such cases
are avoided if we consider two countries where both abatement costs and
deposition reductions are largest for one of the countries in the first optimisation.
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Proposition Three. If both abatement costs and deposition reductions are
larger for country i than for country k (or inverse) in the first optimisation, and the
change-rates of differences in abatement costs and deposition reductions take the
same signs, then the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country that
obtains the largest net increase in deposition reductions. However, if the change-
rates take different signs, the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the
country that obtains the smallest net increase in deposition reductions. (Proof is
offered in appendix A.)
Since the conditions for positive change-rates are similar in (29) and (30),
the change-rates will take the same sign for many values on parameters and
shadow prices. Still, the change-rates can in general take different signs.
Proposition Four. Even though the cost-effective solution for reduced
acidification is changed as a result of modified targets, and a country i has larger
abatement costs and larger deposition reductions than another country k in the
first optimisation, the net increase in abatement costs can be smallest for that
country that obtains the largest net increase in deposition reductions. (The proof is
trivial by proposition three since (29) and (30) can take different signs.)
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that two countries i and k are non-
binding in the first optimisation, such that ( ) ( )1 1, ,out outi ka a a a= , and country i has a
smaller technology parameter than country k ( )i kA A< . Then, from (26) and (27),
both abatement costs and deposition reductions are lager for country i than for
country k in the first optimisation. Suppose now that the sum of shadow prices is
increased from the first to the second optimisation. Suppose also that country i is
non-binding in the second optimisation too while country k is binding. Since the
sum of shadow prices is increased, existing differences in abatement costs and
deposition reductions are increased for given weighted averages of atmospheric
transport coefficients. However, since country k is binding in the second
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optimisation, we know that the weighted average of atmospheric transport
coefficients for this country has increased ( )2 1outk ka a a> = . From (26) and (27) we
can see that this gives a partial decrease in the existing differences. Since there are
two opposing effects, existing differences can be increased or decreased. Suppose
that the difference in deposition reductions has increased. However, from section 2
we know that the extra deposition reductions obtained by binding countries are
relatively costly. The difference in abatement costs for countries i and k can
therefore be decreased even though the difference in deposition reductions has
increased, and this explains proposition four. However, if country i is binding in the
second optimisation instead of country k, it is obvious from this discussion that the
net increase in both abatement costs and deposition reductions will be larger for
country i than for country k.
Proposition Five. If both abatement cost and deposition reductions in
domestic grids are larger for country i than for country k in a cost-effective solution
for reduced acidification, and the targets for acidification are changed, then the
country that have to carry the largest net increase in abatement costs also obtain
the largest net increase in deposition reductions if either
(a) the weighted average of atmospheric transport coefficients for country i is
increased or constant while the opposite is true for country k’s coefficient and
the sum of shadow prices is increased, or
(b) the weighted average of atmospheric transport coefficients for country i is
reduced or constant while the opposite is true for country k’s coefficient and
sum of shadow prices is reduced. (Proof is offered in appendix A).
Proposition five can be used to evaluate the relative changes among non-
binding countries. From (16) we know that the weighted average of atmospheric
transport coefficients are equal to aout for such countries. Therefore, from (26) and
(27), both abatement costs and deposition reductions in the first optimisation is
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larger for a non-binding country i than for another non-binding country k if i kA A< ,
and vice versa. The conditions under (a) in proposition five are therefore satisfied
for any pair of non-binding countries if the sum of shadow prices is increased,
while the conditions under (b) are satisfied for the same countries if the sum of
shadow prices is reduced.
Proposition Six. If the cost-effective solution for reduced acidification is
changed as a result of modified targets, then, for any pair of countries that are non-
binding in both optimisations, the country that have to carry the largest net
increase in abatement costs also obtains the largest net increase in deposition
reductions. (Proof is offered in appendix A).
This is probably the most important finding in this paper since it implies an
unambiguous negative correlation between changes in acid depositions and the
corresponding changes in abatement costs for the bulk of countries.
Proposition five can also be used to evaluate relative changes for two
countries where one of them or both are binding in at least one optimisation.
Suppose for instance that the sum of shadow prices is increased, that both
abatement costs and deposition reductions is larger for country i than for country k
in the first optimisation, and that the weighted atmospheric transport coefficient is
increased for country i (for instance because it is binding only in the second
optimisation) while it is reduced or constant for country k (for instance because it is
non-binding in both optimisations). In this case the net increase in both abatement
costs and deposition reductions will be larger for country i than for country k.
However, if
(a) the abatement costs are larger for country i than for country k in the first
optimisation while country k obtain a larger deposition reduction in domestic
grids than country i, or
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(b) the difference between the atmospheric transport coefficients is smallest in the
scenario where the sum of shadow prices is largest or
(c) the weighted averages of atmospheric transport coefficients are increased for
both countries under consideration, or decreased for both countries,
then proposition five gives no information about the relative changes in
abatements costs and deposition reductions.
We can, however, find unambiguous results as long as the relative weighted
averages of atmospheric transport coefficients is largest in the optimisation where
the sum of shadow prices is largest.
Proposition Seven. If both abatement cost and deposition reductions in
domestic grids are larger for country i than for country k, in a cost-effective solution
for reduced acidification, and the weighted average of atmospheric transport
coefficients are increased or constant for both countries, and an eventually
increase is relatively largest for country i’s coefficient, then the positive differences
in abatement costs and deposition reductions are increased for any increase in the
sum of shadow prices. If, on the other hand, the sum of shadow prices is reduced,
and the weighted coefficients are reduced for both countries but relatively more
for country i, then the positive difference in abatement costs and deposition
reductions are reduced. (Proof is offered in appendix A.) 
Now we consider the signs of change for individual countries. The changes
in abatement costs and deposition reductions for a country k are given by
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where the set nbI I⊂  is the set of countries that are non-binding in both
optimisations. The shadow prices and the weighted average of atmospheric
transport coefficients determine the signs in both (31) and (32) for given values on
parameters. However, the conditions for positive changes are not identical.
Proposition Eight. If the cost-effective solution for reduced acidification is
changed as a result of modified targets, the change in abatement costs can in
general take the opposite sign as the change in deposition reductions for any
country. (The proof is trivial from (31) and (32)).
For the non-binding countries ( )nbk I∈  the weighted averages of
atmospheric transport coefficients are constant equal to aout. For these countries
the changes in abatement costs and deposition reductions are given by 
( ) ( )1 2 12 1 1 11
b
b b bout
b b
k k j jj j
b
k
a
c c
A b
λ λ
−
− −
   
 
− = −      
  (33)
and
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 2 1 2 1
11
1 1 11
2 11 1
1
1 2 1
2 11                  + 
nb
in out out
k k k k i ii
bout outb
in out outb b
j jj j i I
k i
b
out b i
j jj
i
R R a a r r a r r
a a
a a a
A b A b
a
a
A b
λ λ
λ λ
−
−
− −
∈
−
−
− = − − + −
 
     
= − − +          
	 
	 
 	 
  
 
− 
	 


  
 ( )
1
1 1 1
1 .nb
b
b i
i I j
i
a
A b
−
−
∉
 
  
  	 
  
 
   (34)
26
Proposition Nine. If the sum of shadow prices is increased (decreased) as a
result of modified targets for acidification, abatement costs are increased
(decreased) for countries that are non-binding in both optimisations. However, the
change in acid depositions within these countries can in general take both signs.
(The proof is trivial from (33) and (34).
An increase in the sum of shadow prices increases the abated amount for all
non-binding countries, including country nbk I∈ . This gives a partial reduction in
the deposited amount in domestic locations for country k. The increased sum of
abatement in other non-binding countries gives additional deposition reductions
for country nbk I∈ . All other countries ( )nbi I∉  also abate a larger amount for given
values on the weighted average of transport coefficients. Finally, some countries
( )nbi I∉  increase their abatement additionally since their weighted averages of
atmospheric transport coefficients have increased from the first to the second
optimisation. All these effects give partial reductions in the amounts of acids
deposited within country nbk I∈ . However, the weighted average of atmospheric
transport coefficients will typically decrease for some countries. The signs in the
last parenthesis in (34) are therefore ambiguous, and then the sign of equation (34)
is ambiguous too. However, the positive elements in (34) will probably dominate in
many cases when the sum of shadow prices is increased.
Proposition Ten. If the cost-effective solution for reduced acidification is
changed as a result of modified targets and the sum of shadow prices is increased
(decreased), and
(a) the share of non-binding countries is large enough, or
(b) the sum of abatement for the set of countries that are binding in at least one
optimisation is increased (decreased) or the decrease (increase) is small
enough, or
(c) the increase (decrease) in the sum of shadow prices is large enough, or
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(d) the technology parameter ( )kA  for a non-binding country k is small enough,
then the net changes in acid depositions and abatement costs for the non-binding
country k will take the same signs. (Proof is offered in appendix A).
Since an increase in the sum of shadow prices gives a partial increase in
abatement for all countries, we can expect that the abatement in many cases also
will increase for the set of countries that are binding in at least one optimisation.
For all such cases we know from (b) that the net change in acid depositions for any
non-binding country will take the same sign as the net change in abatement costs
the same country. Also, typically, there are only a few binding countries. Therefore,
from (a), the reduction in acid depositions caused by increased abatement in non-
binding countries will in many cases dominate an eventual reduction in abatement
for the other countries. From (c) we also know that the positive effects on reduced
depositions certainly will dominate if the sum of shadow prices increases enough.
However, if the amount of acid depositions is increased for a non-binding country
k, even though the sum of shadow prices has increased, we know from (d) that the
technology parameter (Ak) is likely to be relatively large for this country. It is
reasonable to associate large technology parameters with small countries since no-
control emissions typically are small for these countries, and this reduces the
amount of abatement that can be carried out by the cheapest abatement
techniques.
Now we consider a country that has a larger weighted average of
atmospheric transport coefficients in the second optimisation than in the first. If
the sum of shadow prices is increased, this country will abate a larger amount.
Therefore, based on the arguments for non-binding countries, the changes in costs
and deposition reductions will typically take the same signs for these countries
also.
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This section has shown (a) under which conditions the net increase in
abatement costs is largest for the countries that obtain the largest net increase in
deposition reductions, and (b) under which conditions the net changes in
abatement costs and deposition reductions take the same sign for individual
countries. The most unambiguous results are found for non-binding countries. The
conditions under (a) are always satisfied for these countries, while the conditions
under (b) are satisfied for many cases.
4. Numerical Illustrations
This section illustrates analytical findings in a numerical example. Suppose that
there is one country for each letter in the alphabet. Suppose also that 1/ nci iA e= ,
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 251000 1.25 1.25 ... 1.25nc nc nc nca b c ze e e e− − −= = = = , 1.75b = , 0.1ina = , 0.01outa =
and 100jd = . In addition we need two sets of targets for acid depositions. These
targets can of course be assumed directly. However, the targets in the first
optimisation are calculated as follows. Ecosystems have a certain buffer capacity
for acid depositions, called critical loads.9 If the amount of acid depositions is larger
than the critical load for an ecosystem, then the difference is called an exceedance.
The first set of targets requires a 60% reduction of all exceedances compared to no-
control. Consequently, we also need a set of critical loads in order to calculate the
targets. It is assumed that critical loads are equal to 150 for all ecosystems in
countries b, c and d, while critical loads are equal to 2000 elsewhere. This is
motivated by the small tolerance for acid depositions in the relatively small
Scandinavian countries. Table 1 reports no-control numbers, critical loads and
resulting targets, while optimisation-results are reported in table 2. GAMS codes
are offered in appendix B.
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(Tables 1-2 about here).
In the second optimisation, acid depositions are restricted by a common value,
called ceiling, everywhere. The ceiling is calibrated to 9500 since this gives
approximately the same total abatement costs in the two optimisations. Figure 6
shows how abatement costs and the amounts of reduced depositions are changed
from the first to the second optimisation.
(Figure 6 about here).
The numerical example illustrates some of the findings stated in propositions.
(a) Net reductions in acid depositions are larger for countries that have to carry
larger abatement costs (v-z) than for any of the other countries. This is stated in
proposition one.
(b) Country t has larger abatement costs and larger deposition reductions than
country q in the first optimisation.  Still, the net changes in abatement costs and
depositions (not deposition reductions) are largest for country q. This proves
proposition four by an example. Another example is given by countries u and
m.
(c) The weighted averages of atmospheric transport coefficients have been
reduced for countries b-d while they are constant for countries e-h. Also, the
sum of shadow prices has also been reduced, and both abatement costs and
reductions in acid depositions are larger for countries b-d in the first
optimisation than for countries e-h. Consequently, (b) in proposition five
implies that the net change in abatement costs and deposition reductions are
less for countries b-d than for countries e-h. Table 2 shows that this is satisfied.
(d) From figure 6 we can see that if a non-binding country (a, e-r) has a larger net
increase in abatement costs than another non-binding country, then the former
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country obtains a smaller net increase in depositions. This is implied by
proposition six.
(e) The net change in abatement costs take the same sign as the net change in
reduced depositions for all countries (a-z), including the non-binding countries
(a, e-r). Since the sum of shadow prices is reduced and total abatement in
binding countries is increased less than the total decrease in abatement for
non-binding countries, (b) in proposition ten is exemplified.
5. Summary and Conclusions
In the negotiations within LRTAP there have been some discussions about the
consequences of using different targeting principles for acidification. However,
some RAINS simulations for cost-effective abatement indicate that, if two
scenarios are compared, countries typically obtain the largest reductions in
acidification in the scenario where they have to carry the largest abatement costs.
In addition, a country typically obtains larger reductions in mean acidification than
another country if the former country have to carry larger abatement costs than
the latter country.
This paper adds empirical evidence for this Eco-Correlation, and it is shown
how the Eco-Correlation is implied by a simple model. In section 2, a formal model
for cost-effective reductions of acidification in Europe was developed. The analysis
showed that it is hard to establish any interesting relationship between countries’
abatement costs and domestic reductions in acid depositions in the general case.
However, based on RAINS calculated deposition maps, the atmospheric transport
coefficients to domestic grids (locations) were assumed to be larger than the
transport coefficients to foreign grids. Also, all coefficients were assumed to take
one out of two values. Under this assumption it was possible to show that
differences in the abated amount determine differences in domestic reductions in
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acid depositions. Also, abatement costs for non-binding countries are given by the
same linear function of domestic reductions in acid depositions. Binding
countries, however, obtain additional reductions in acid depositions, but at
relatively large costs.
The main findings in this paper concern the signs and relative sizes of the
changes in countries’ abatement costs and deposition reductions that occur when
the targets for acidification are modified. The most important findings are given in
(a)-(c).
(a) The net increase in both abatement costs and deposition reductions are
larger for all countries that have to carry larger abatement costs than for
any of the other countries.
(b) If the net increase in abatement costs for a non-binding country is larger
than the net cost increase for another non-binding country, then the
former country also obtains the largest net increase in reduced
depositions.
(c) If a non-binding country has to carry increased abatement costs when
targets for acidification are changed, it typically obtains additional
reductions in acid depositions at domestic locations also, and vice versa.
However, there may be exceptions, in particular for small countries.
These findings can be explained as follows. The model suppresses the variation in
the atmospheric transport coefficients to foreign locations. Relative differences in
reduced depositions among countries are therefore given by the relative
differences in the abated amounts, and (a) follows directly. Since the non-binding
countries have identical average abatement costs in a cost-effective solution, the
abated amount among the non-binding countries is largest for the country that
have to carry largest abatement costs. Then, by (a), this country also obtains the
largest reductions in depositions. If the sum of shadow prices is increased when
the targets for acidification are modified, these differences are scaled up, and vice
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versa, and (b) follows. The explanations for (c) are basically that (1) domestic
deposition reductions are influenced relatively a lot from countries’ own
abatement, (2) the abatement for all non-binding countries moves in the same
direction, (3) the share of non-binding countries is typically relatively large and (4)
an increase in the sum of shadow prices gives a partial increase in abatement also
for countries that are binding in at least one optimisation. However, this finding is
not is not so robust as (a) and (b).
The model and the findings in this paper will probably be relevant also for
other environmental problems that are caused by transboundary emissions
(disposals) that are non-uniformly dispersed. Some candidates are
eurtrophication, ground-level ozone, particulate matter, poisons algae and
accumulation of various chemicals in the food chain.
Notes
1. In Montgomery’s analysis it is assumed that all environmental constraints can be stated in terms
of concentrations. However, this is not trivial for acidification since nitrogen (NOx and NH3)
contribute to acidification (together with SO2) only if the deposited amount is large enough.
Consequently, there is not one unique linear function of nitrogen and sulphur, measured for
instance in sulphur-equivalents, such that the values of the function give the level of acidification.
A possible solution for this is to establish two permit markets for each region, which in
combination secure protection against acidification for a certain ecosystem in each region. In the
first market, permits for SO2 depositions are traded, and the amount of permits equals the critical
load for SO2 in the selected ecosystem (under the assumption that nitrogen depositions are no
larger than background values). In the second market, a permit is an allowance to deposit a
certain combination of sulphur and nitrogen. The amount of permits is such that any possible
combination of acid depositions, in accordance with this market, is exactly on the critical load
function for the selected ecosystem if SO2 emissions are less than the critical load for SO2. An
emitter must buy permits in both markets, and, taken together, the two markets ensure that
acidification will be no larger than the intended level. Typically, at most one constraint (on
sulphur or on all acids) will be binding in the optimal solution, implying excess supply and a price
equal to zero in at least one market for each region. In theory it is therefore possible to establish a
(combined) pollution permit market also for acidification.
2. Regional Acidification INformation and Simulation
3. See UN/ECE (1999) for the new protocol and Amann et al. (1998b, 1998d, 1999a,1999b) for recent
RAINS optimisation scenarios prepared for the convention.
4. In general, the deposition of sulphur and nitrogen in 150x150 km EMEP10 grids covering all
Europe is calculated this way in the RAINS model (Alcamo and Hordijk 1990; Amann et al. 1998b,
part a).
5. Many countries share EMEP grids (the locations in the RAINS model), but in order to avoid further
complications this is not accounted for here.
6. Policy makers will certainly take into account acidification changes, in addition to cost changes,
before they eventually choose to trade emission rights. This is typically not taken into account in
the existing literature. See for instance Burtraw et al. (1998), Førsund and Nævdal (1998), Klaassen
et al. (1994) or Rodríguez (1999). See Klaassen (1993) for an analysis of the differences in costs and
ecosystem protection for European countries in some trading schemes, compared to a proposal
for the second sulphur protocol. See Nentjes (1994) for an analysis of emission trading where
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parties consider both abatement costs and environmental improvement before they eventually
trade.
7. Actually aka
out, but ak for a binding country is equal to a
out only in the special case where all
binding grids within country k are binding only on the margin so that all corresponding shadow
prices are zero.
8. The label on the x-axis must however be changed from “Differences in mean accumulated excess
… “ to “Changed acid depositions in domestic grids”. These concepts are similar but not identical
since the latter concept doesn’t account for differences in buffer capacities in ecosystems, but
that is a relatively minor difference when differences between two optimisations are considered.
9. Critical loads for acidification is calculated for all Europe. See Posch et al. (1995) and (1997).
10. Co-operative programme for monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transmission of air
pollutants in Europe.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof for proposition two.
The change-rate for differences in abatement costs is given by
 ( ) ( )
( )
2 2 1 1
1 1
i k i k
i k
i k
c c c c
c c
c c
∧
− − −
− ≡
−
.                            (A1)
If 1 1 0i kc c− >  and 

0i kc c
∧
− > , then, from (A1), we know that ( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− > −  so
that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country that has largest
abatement costs initially. If 1 1 0i kc c− <  and 

0i kc c
∧
− >  then ( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− < −  so
that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country that has largest
abatement costs initially. Existing differences in abatement costs are therefore
increased if the change-rate for differences in abatement costs is positive. If,
however, 1 1 0i kc c− >  and 

0i kc c
∧
− < , then we know that ( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− < −  so
that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country that has smallest
abatement costs initially. Also, if 1 1 0i kc c− <  and 

0i kc c
∧
− < , then we know that
( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− > −  so that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the
country that has smallest abatement costs initially. In total, the net increase in
abatement costs is largest for the country that has largest abatement costs initially
if the change-rate for differences in abatement costs is positive, and vice versa. The
argument with respect to relative changes in reduced depositions is identical,
except that (a) tqc ( )1,2 ,t q i k= =  is replaced by tqR  and (b) the term abatement
costs (or simply costs) is replaced by amounts of reduced depositions.
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Proof for proposition three.
By assumption, both abatement costs and the amounts of reduced depositions is
largest for one of the countries under consideration { },i k  in the first optimisation.
Let the costs and the amounts of reduced depositions by convention be largest for
country i. Then 1 1 0i kc c− >  and 
1 1
0i kR R− > . Consequently, from (A1),
( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− > −  if and only if  0i kc c
∧
− > , while ( ) ( )2 1 2 1i i k kc c c c− < −  if and only
if

0i kc c
∧
− < . In total, the net increase in abatement costs is largest for the country
that has largest abatement costs initially if the change-rate for differences in
abatement costs is positive, and vice versa. Also, since the same type of argument
can be used for reduced depositions, the country the have to carry the largest net
increase in abatement costs also obtain the largest net increase in reduced
depositions if the change-rates take the same sign. If, however, the change-rates
take different signs, then the net increase in costs is largest for the country that
obtain the smallest net increase in reduced depositions.
Proof for proposition five
By assumption, both abatement costs and deposition reductions are largest for one
of the countries under consideration { },i k  in the first optimisation. Let costs and
the amounts of reduced depositions by convention be largest for country i. Then
1 1
0i kc c− >  and 
1 1
0i kR R− > . Since these assumptions satisfies the conditions in
proposition three, we know that the net increase in abatement costs is largest for
the country that obtains the largest net increase in deposition reductions if the
change-rates in (29) and (30) take the same sign.
First we consider the case under (a) in proposition five so that 2 1i ia a≥ ,
2 1
k ka a≤  and 
2 1
j jj j
λ λ>  . Since  1 1 0i kc c− >  we know from (26) and (27) that the
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denominators in the second fractions in (29) and (30) are positive. Also, since
2 1
i ia a≥  and 
2 1
k ka a≤  the corresponding nominators are equal to or larger than the
denominators, and this implies that the fractions are at least 1. Since the sum of
shadow prices by assumption in (a) is increased from the first to the second
optimisation, the first fraction is larger than 1 too. Consequently, since the product
of the numbers that are larger than 1 also is larger than 1, both change-rates are
positive, and (a) in proposition five follows from proposition three.
Now we consider the case under (b) in proposition five, so that 2 1i ia a≤ ,
2 1
k ka a≥  and 
2 1
j jj j
λ λ<  . Since  1 1 0i kc c− >  we know from (26) and (27) that the
second denominators in (29) and (30) are positive. Also, since 2 1i ia a≤  and 
2 1
k ka a≥
the corresponding nominators are less or equal to the denominators, and this
implies that the fractions are equal to or less than 1. Since the sum of shadow
prices is reduced from the first to the second optimisation, the first fraction is less
than 1. Consequently, since the product of two numbers less than 1 also is less than
1, both change-rates are negative, and (b) in proposition five follows from
proposition three.
Proof for proposition six
By assumption 1 2 1 2 outi i k ka a a a a= = = = . If 
2 1
j jj j
λ λ>   the conditions under (a) in
proposition five are satisfied. These are: 2 1i ia a≥ ,
2 1
k ka a≤  and 
2 1
j jj j
λ λ>  . If
2 1
j jj j
λ λ<   the conditions under (b) in proposition five are satisfied.
Proof for proposition seven
Since abatement costs and deposition reductions by assumption are larger for
country i than for country k in the first optimisation, we know from (26) and (27)
that
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,              (A3)
where (A2) and (A3) are denominators in (29) and (30) respectively. Let the relative
weighted average of atmospheric transport coefficients be defined by
t
t i
t
k
a
a
θ ≡ { }1,2t ∈ ,               (A4)
while the relative change in country k’s coefficient is defined by
2
1
k
k
a
a
γ ≡ .              (A5)
If we substitute (A4) into (A2) and (A3) for t=1, we get
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If we substitute (A4) and (A5) into the numerators in (29) and (30) we get
( )
1 1
12 1
1 1
1
b bb b
b
k
i k
a
A A
θγ
−
−
−
 
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Equations (29) and (30) can therefore be written as
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Since the denominators in (A10) and (A11) are positive by (A6) and (A7), it follows
that both change-rates are positive if the sum of shadow prices has increased and
1γ ≥  and 2 1θ θ> . Also, both change-rates are negative if the sum of shadow prices
is reduced 0 1γ< ≤  and 2 1θ θ< . Proposition seven follows.
Proof for proposition ten
From (33) it is trivial that the abatement costs for a non-binding country are
increased if the sum of shadow prices is increased, and vice versa. Therefore, we
only have to show that the net change in deposition reductions take the same sign
as the net change in the sum of shadow prices if at least one of the conditions in
(a)-(d) is satisfied.
Condition (a). Let the variable n with a top script be the number of countries
in the set given by the top script. For instance, the number of countries in the set Inb
is given by 
nbIn .  Then the share of countries that which are non-binding (θ) can be
written as
[ ]0,1
nbIn
n
θ ≡ ∈ .            (A12)
We also define some additional variables
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Equation (34) can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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From (A14) we can see that, for any increase (decrease) in the sum of shadow
prices, and for any values on nbIγ  and / nbI Iγ , the expression in (A14) will be positive
(negative) if θ  is large enough. This concludes the proof.
In an extreme case (A14) may be positive (negative) only if 1/n nθ > −  and
this requires that nbn n= . But then the sum of shadow prices is equal to zero in
both optimisations so that deposition reductions and abatement costs are equal to
zero. The net change in deposition reductions is positive (negative) in this case
also, but not strictly positive (negative). Moreover, this is not an interesting case.
Condition (b). If the sum of shadow prices is increased (decreased), the
abated amounts in all non-binding countries are increased (decreased). If, in
addition, the sum of abatement in countries that are binding in at least one
optimisation is increased (decreased), then total abatement is increased
(decreased). Consequently, from (34), the net change in deposition reductions is
positive (negative) for all non-binding countries. Also, if the abatement in countries
that are binding in at least one optimisation is decreased (increased), and this
decrease (increase) is less than the increase (decrease) in abatement in non-
binding countries, then total abatement is increased (decreased). Consequently,
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from (34), the net change in deposition reductions for the non-binding country k is
positive (negative).
Condition (c). Suppose that the sum of shadow prices is increased
(decreased) a lot. Then, from (34), the net change in deposition reductions is
positive (negative).
Condition (d). Equation (34) is monotonically decreasing in the technology
parameter for the non-binding country k, Ak.
Appendix B: Gams Codes
SET
i countries
/a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u,v,w,x,y,z/
j domestic grids for each country
/1,2,3/
t optimisations
/1,2/;
;
ALIAS(i,k)
ALIAS(j,jj)
;
VARIABLES
e(i,t) emissions
r(i,t) abatement
c(i,t) abatement costs
D(i,j,t) depositions
R1(i,j,t) deposition reductions
;
POSITIVE VARIABLES
lambda(i,j,t) shadow prices on acid depositions
;
PARAMETERS
b power in cost function /1.75/
a_in coefficient to domestic grids /0.1/
a_out coefficient to foreign grids /0.01/
d_back background depositions /100/
e_nc(i) no-control emissions
A(i) constant-term in cost function
D_con(i,j,t) constraints on acid depositions
ceiling a ceiling on depositions /9500/
c_loads(i) critical loads
D_nc(i,j) definition of no-control depositions
;
e_nc(i)=1000*(1+0.25)**(ord(i)-1);
A(i)=1/e_nc(i);
44
c_loads(i) = 150$(ord (i)>1 and ord(i)<5)
+2000$(ord(i)=1 or ord(i)>4);
D_nc(i,j) = d_back+(a_in-a_out)*e_nc(i)+sum(k,a_out*e_nc(k));
EQUATIONS
qr_def(i,t) definition of abatement
qc_def(i,t) definition of abatement costs
qD_def(i,j,t) definition of depositions
qR1_def(i,j,t) definition of deposition reductions
qr(i,t) f.o.c. for abatement
qD(i,j,t) constraints on acid depositions
;
qr_def(i,t).. r(i,t) =e= e_nc(i)-e(i,t);
qc_def(i,t).. c(i,t) =e= A(i)*r(i,t)**b;
qD_def(i,j,t).. D(i,j,t) =e=
d_back+(a_in-a_out)*e(i,t)+sum(k,a_out*e(k,t));
qR1_def(i,j,t).. R1(i,j,t) =e= D_nc(i,j)- D(i,j,t);
qr(i,t).. A(i)*b*r(i,t)**(b-1) =e=
sum(j,(a_in-
a_out)*lambda(i,j,t))+sum((k,j),a_out*lambda(k,j,t));
qD(i,j,t).. D_con(i,j,t) =g= D(i,j,t);
* First targets: 60% reductions in exceedance depositions
D_con(i,j,'1')=[ d_back+(a_in-a_out)*e_nc(i)+sum(k,a_out*e_nc(k))
- c_loads(i)]*0.4 + c_loads(i);
* Second targets: Depositions are ceiled by a common value
D_con(i,j,'2')= ceiling;
model eco
/qr_def.e,qc_def.c,qD_def.d,qR1_def.R1,qr.r,qD.lambda/;
solve eco using mcp;
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Figure 1: Abatement costs and mean accumulated excess values in the Ceiling scenario minus those in the
U.A. scenario.
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Figure 2: Abatement costs and mean accumulated excess values in the High ambition level acidification
scenario minus those in the Central scenario.
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Figure 3: Depositions from German SO2 emissions.
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Figure 4: Depositions from Dutch NH3 emissions.
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Figure 5: Depositions from UK NOx emissions.
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       Figure 6: Cost and deposition changes from the first to the second optimisation.
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  Binding in first optimisation
+  Non-binding in both optimisations
•  Binding in second optimisation
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Table 1: No-control numbers, critical loads and targets.
Countries No-control
emissions
No-control
depositions
Critical
loads
Exceedance
in no-control
Target
1
Target
2
a 1000 13385 150 13235 6554 9500
b 1250 13407 150 13257 5453 9500
c 1563 13436 2000 11436 5464 9500
d 1953 13471 2000 11471 5478 9500
e 2441 13515 2000 11515 6606 9500
f 3052 13570 2000 11570 6628 9500
g 3815 13638 2000 11638 6655 9500
h 4768 13724 2000 11724 6690 9500
i 5960 13831 2000 11831 6733 9500
j 7451 13965 2000 11965 6786 9500
k 9313 14133 2000 12133 6853 9500
l 11642 14343 2000 12343 6937 9500
m 14552 14605 2000 12605 7042 9500
n 18190 14932 2000 12932 7173 9500
o 22737 15341 2000 13341 7337 9500
p 28422 15853 2000 13853 7541 9500
q 35527 16492 2000 14492 7797 9500
r 44409 17292 2000 15292 8117 9500
s 55511 18291 2000 16291 8516 9500
t 69389 19540 2000 17540 9016 9500
u 86736 21101 2000 19101 9640 9500
v 108420 23053 2000 21053 10421 9500
w 135525 25492 2000 23492 11397 9500
x 169407 28541 2000 26541 12617 9500
y 211758 32353 2000 30353 14141 9500
z 264698 37118 2000 35118 16047 9500
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Table 2: Optimisation results.
Countries Lam-
bda 1
Lam-
bda 2
Mean
atm.
coeff
1
Mean
atm.
coeff
2
Costs
1
Costs
2
Cost
change
Acid
dep.
red.
1
Acid
dep.
red.
2
Acid
dep.
change
a - - 0.01 0.01 4.2 0.7 -3.6 7860 7753 107
b 2.40 - 0.044 0.01 185.5 0.9 -184.6 7954 7755 200
c 2.08 - 0.040 0.01 192.7 1.2 -191.5 7971 7756 215
d 1.80 - 0.036 0.01 204.0 1.6 -202.4 7992 7759 234
e - - 0.01 0.01 14.0 2.2 -11.8 7885 7762 123
f - - 0.01 0.01 18.8 3.0 -15.8 7897 7766 131
g - - 0.01 0.01 25.3 4.0 -21.3 7913 7772 141
h - - 0.01 0.01 34.1 5.4 -28.7 7935 7780 156
i - - 0.01 0.01 45.9 7.2 -38.7 7965 7790 175
j - - 0.01 0.01 61.8 9.8 -52.1 8005 7804 201
k - - 0.01 0.01 83.3 13.1 -70.1 8058 7822 236
l - - 0.01 0.01 112.1 17.7 -94.4 8131 7848 283
m - - 0.01 0.01 151.0 23.8 -127.1 8228 7882 347
n - - 0.01 0.01 203.3 32.1 -171.2 8359 7927 432
o - - 0.01 0.01 273.7 43.2 -230.5 8536 7989 547
p - - 0.01 0.01 368.6 58.2 -310.4 8774 8072 702
q - - 0.01 0.01 496.3 78.3 -417.9 9094 8183 911
r - - 0.01 0.01 668.2 105.5 -562.8 9525 8333 1192
s - 0.07 0.01 0.012 899.8 232.5 -667.4 10106 8791 1315
t - 0.25 0.01 0.018 1211.6 738.8 -472.8 10888 10040 848
u - 0.35 0.01 0.021 1631.5 1467.9 -163.5 11941 11601 340
v - 0.41 0.01 0.023 2196.8 2406.3 209.5 13358 13553 -194
w - 0.44 0.01 0.024 2958.0 3557.5 599.5 15267 15992 -725
x - 0.45 0.01 0.024 3983.1 4937.2 954.1 17837 19041 -1204
y - 0.44 0.01 0.024 5363.3 6570.8 1207.5 21298 22853 -1555
z - 0.43 0.01 0.024 7221.8 8493.6 1271.9 25959 27618 -1659
